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Abstract
Knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) are special in that they rely on 
knowledge exchange between service providers and consumers and thus inten-
sive cooperation between the two parties is essential at all stages. This implies 
approaches to find the “right” provider may have to differ from those used in the sec-
tor of more homogeneous services and goods. Public procurement regulation aims 
to improve competitiveness, yet does this help achieving the best value for money in 
the procurement of KIBS? Legislative constraints on the types of admissible public 
procurement mechanisms may have an undesirable effect on the provider selection, 
meaning that services may not be purchased from the most efficient or the most suit-
able provider. As a benchmark, private consumers are unconstrained in their choice 
of KIBS providers. We exploit this difference to study the efficiency of KIBS pur-
chases by the public sector, as compared to that in the private sector. Using the 2007 
and 2011 waves of a unique survey of KIBS consumers in Russia, we find, inter 
alia, that the public sector reports lower satisfaction from KIBS and admits a lower 
level of co-production than the private sector. Our main recommendations refer to 
the optimal choice of public procurement methods.
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1 Introduction
Broadly defined, public procurement regulation aims to ensure purchases of goods 
and services for public needs are “best value for taxpayers’ money” (Dimitri 2013), 
typically by promoting competitiveness of procurement procedures.1 Similarly, pri-
vate businesses aim to ensure investors’ money is used most efficiently. The dif-
ference is that extant agency problems are significantly constrained by free market 
forces in the case of the “private business—investor” relationship, and to a large 
degree unconstrained in the case of the “public body—taxpayer” relationship. As 
Spagnolo (2012) puts it, public procurement regulation is needed to “keep public 
buyers accountable in the absence of market pressures”; he also emphasizes rigid-
ities of public procurement rules, particularly with regard to the value of provid-
ers’ reputation. Reputation is a quality signal, useful when the quality of services 
or goods mostly depends on their provider. This does not hold for services that are 
co-produced by and require knowledge exchange between providers and consum-
ers, such as knowledge intensive [business] services (KIBS). In this paper we ask 
whether public bodies are able to achieve “the best value for money” in this spe-
cific sector. In particular, we want to know if competitive procurement procedures 
are indeed optimal in the notoriously heterogeneous KIBS sector. As a natural 
benchmark for choices and outcomes we use those reported by private businesses, 
for which, as highlighted above, market pressures safeguard efficiency. Data comes 
from a unique survey of KIBS consumers, both public and private, run in Russia in 
2007 and 2011.
KIBS are a rapidly developing sector in modern economies. They facilitate inno-
vation processes and foster technological development (see e.g. Antonelli 1998; 
den Hertog 2000; Haukness 2000; Muller and Zenker 2001; Tether 2003; Koch and 
Stahlecker 2006; Simmie and Strambach 2006; Link and Swann 2016). In a recent 
contribution, Iossa et al. (2018) discuss and review relevant literature on public pro-
curement of innovations, however their focus is on types of contracts to be used 
in innovation procurement, while our emphasis is on the selection of the service 
provider. One of the key properties of KIBS is customization; the service is tailored 
to the individual needs of the particular customer and cannot be replicated (see dis-
cussion by Tether et al. 2001). This requires a high intensity of co-production (the 
involvement of customers in the provision of the service, see for example Marion 
1997, Spohrer and Maglio 2008). Co-production generates a spillover of knowledge 
between the service provider and the customer (Doroshenko 2012; Miles 2012). This 
knowledge transfer distinguishes KIBS from other goods and services, and implies 
that the use of standard economic mechanisms for the selection of service provid-
ers might lead to inefficient outcomes. This is mainly due to the competitive nature 
of the most commonly used mechanisms, where competition is not well defined for 
1 This wording is often used by policy-makers and consultants, see, e.g. “The purpose and future direc-
tion of public procurement regulation” by S. Bruun-Nielsen, available at http://eupub licpr ocure ment.org.
ua/the-purpo se-and-futur e-direc tion-of-publi c-procu remen t-regul ation .html?lang=en.
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heterogeneous (customized) products. The problem is most evident for public pro-
curement procedures.
The role of public procurement is twofold. First, it is aimed at obtaining goods 
and services for public needs. Second, government purchases can be used to pro-
vide a stimulus via state intervention to support selected economic sectors (and 
the economy as a whole) through the multiplier effect.2 For example, Edler and 
Georghiou (2007) discuss the stimulating role of public procurement with regard 
to innovations, and Antonelli (2016) stresses the role of public procurement in the 
transition to the knowledge economy. This effect, in turn, may be both direct, by 
purchasing the services from the KIBS sector, and indirect, by demonstrating the 
benefits of KIBS consumption to the private sector (the indirect effect is discussed 
in Doroshenko 2012). Typically, private institutions fix small budgets for externally 
ordered services, but some priority areas may attract preferential public financing, 
thus becoming more attractive for customers. Science and the research and develop-
ment of innovations are examples of sectors where public funding can stimulate pri-
vate demand. In an international context, Uyarra et al. (2014) emphasize that public 
procurement mechanisms are associated with “the lack of interaction with procuring 
organizations, the use of over-specified tenders as opposed to outcome based speci-
fications, low competences of procurers and a poor management of risk during the 
procurement process”. These barriers result in the reduced ability of suppliers to 
innovate, and in less innovative products and services supplied to the public sector.
Previous research has studied the issue of efficiency of public procurement, par-
ticularly in the Russian context, from various perspectives. For example, Ivanov 
(2012) indicates that although auctions are meant to be a competitive (and thus 
expected to be efficient) method of procurement, they rarely demonstrate price effi-
ciency when used in public procurement in Russia. The author explains this by a 
high degree of corruption. Yakovlev et al. (2013) indicate numerous provisions in 
the legislation that allow purchasing authorities to avoid competitive procedures. At 
the same time, interestingly, they find that the strongest gains from competition in 
procurement become evident with just 2–3 potential suppliers taking part in the pro-
curement procedures. Balsevich et al. (2012) analyze types of opportunistic behavior 
in public procurement, in order to explain inefficiencies in the latter. The vast major-
ity of research interprets inefficiencies in procurement in terms of excessively high 
prices paid or insufficient savings generated by procurement procedures. A notable 
exception here is Balsevich and Pivovarova (2011) who focus on the degree of infor-
mational transparency in public procurement in Russia, which has implications for a 
broader class of (in-)efficiencies.
In our paper, efficiency is linked to a whole range of (potentially unquantifiable) 
criteria that underlie the choice of the procurement method. Regulations, such as 
the UNCITRAL model law, typically understand under the procurement method 
approaches for the selection of the provider of goods and services, such as open 
tender, electronic reverse auction, request-for-proposal, framework agreement, or 
2 E.g. the government may be interested in supporting domestic producers and thus tends to encourage 
purchases of goods and services from them.
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single-source procurement. In our data, we will be able to know how respondents 
select their KIBS providers, distinguishing between procurement from a single pro-
vider, from a limited number of providers already known to the purchasing body, 
or from an unconstrained set of potential providers. As there is a correspondence 
between traditional methods of procurement (as per UNCITRAL) and selection 
approaches in our data, we also refer to the latter as “procurement methods”, in a 
broad sense. We claim that the choice of this method is crucial for achieving effi-
ciency in the consumption of KIBS purchased, and competitive methods of procure-
ments are not necessarily the first best, at least in the procurement of KIBS. As a 
benchmark for efficiency, we take the unconstrained choice by freely competitive 
private businesses, which we then compare with the procurement methods and the 
resulting levels of efficiency in KIBS purchases of public institutions and govern-
ment bodies, which are constrained by the procurement legislation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines efficiency of KIBS purchases 
and outlines the theoretical framework that underpins our research question. Sec-
tion 3 presents our data and explains how it was collected. Section 4 presents the 
main results with regards to the links between the procurement methods chosen by 
private and public firms in our data, and respectively levels of customer satisfaction, 
co-production and absorption of services these firms achieved. Section 5 concludes.
2  Efficiency of KIBS purchases
Our main research question is whether public purchases of KIBS offer the best value 
for money, which seems a natural measure of efficiency in procurement. Measuring 
efficiency is, however, tricky, as the value of KIBS is highly subjective. On the one 
hand, a straightforward approach could be to evaluate the reported satisfaction of 
KIBS consumers, assuming that more satisfaction corresponds to the higher value 
for money. However, this approach may overestimate efficiency, as customers may 
be unaware they could potentially achieve an even higher level of satisfaction. On 
the other hand, value is derived from absorption of services (e.g. Miles 2012), there-
fore focusing on reported levels of absorption would allow us to alternatively assess 
efficiency of KIBS purchases. Moreover, KIBS are known to rely on knowledge 
transfer and to require co-production, both of which ultimately affect the ability of 
KIBS consumers to absorb services. By considering reported levels of co-produc-
tion, we can thus complement the above two views (satisfaction and absorption) on 
efficiency. Similar metrics for private customers of similar KIBS serve as bench-
marks for comparison.
We expect a lower efficiency of KIBS in the public sector for the following rea-
sons: (1) legislative restrictions on the procurement methods may adversely affect 
the choice of suppliers; (2) weaker incentives for the public sector to co-produce 
effectively; (3) the public sector possessing less experience due to legislative provi-
sions that do not encourage long-term relationships with suppliers (anti-corruption 
provisions). We will now explore these three points in more detail.
Generally, public procurement is heavily regulated. Regulation aims to improve 
competitiveness in procurement by ensuring that more potential providers are 
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involved in the procurement mechanism, which would lead to purchasing goods and 
services at lower prices and under better conditions, such as delivery terms. How-
ever, competition is associated mainly with highly homogeneous goods and ser-
vices. For highly customized KIBS, true competition is not really possible due to 
their heterogeneity, and so a degree of flexibility in choice among various procure-
ment procedures is desirable. This is the reason why we suggest that private busi-
ness may be more efficient at selecting the best providers of KIBS than the public 
sector. In particular, we expect private businesses differ from public consumers of 
KIBS in their choice of procurement methods.
Private businesses also have more incentives to be engaged in effective co-pro-
duction with KIBS providers, which would ensure proper customization. The gov-
ernment and public institutions are usually non-profit, and numerous studies show 
internal managerial inefficiencies within them. A review of literature on the advan-
tages of privatized businesses as compared to state-owned ones can be found in 
Megginson and Netter (2001). In a later work, Bartel and Harrison (2005) explicitly 
show that, in comparable conditions, the performance of public sector enterprises is 
below that of their private-sector peers, and privatization is thus deemed to improve 
performance. We also expect a lower degree and efficiency of co-production from 
public consumers of KIBS than from private business, due to better incentives and 
less constraints for private businesses. This implies that the knowledge transfer 
through co-production would not be so pronounced in the public sector, than in the 
private one. In this sense, our paper contributes to the old debate on the differences 
between public and private organizations (see e.g. a seminal review by Rainey et al. 
1976; Lan and Rainey 1992, particularly on managers’ objectives in public and pri-
vate enterprises).
Finally, current procurement regulations either explicitly or implicitly forbid 
long-term customer relationships between procuring bodies and suppliers of goods 
and services. Although there are usually no direct restrictions on establishing long-
term supplier–consumer relationships, legislation requires that standard competitive 
procedures are used for each contract, thereby making it likely that new contracts 
would be served by new suppliers. Moreover, legislation including the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, are very clear about the criteria that can be used to select suppliers, 
prohibiting preferential treatment of any of them. Establishing a long-term relation-
ship with a supplier is therefore complicated. However, a partnership experience and 
trust in the particular KIBS provider may contribute significantly to a customer’s 
absorptive capacity. Private businesses face no constraints in this regard, whilst pub-
lic institutions do, and public institutions would have a poorer experience with KIBS 
and so be less efficient in KIBS consumption, than private businesses.
3  Data
Our study is based on survey data from Russia, which were collected within 
the annual monitoring of the KIBS sector, since 2007. The monitoring covered 
ten sectors: advertising, marketing, audit, IT-services, recruitment, engineer-
ing, financial advice, legal advice, property development services, and business 
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design. This range includes most of the activities described as KIBS in the exist-
ing literature (see e.g. Doroshenko et al. 2013 and 2014, for more details). Spe-
cialized surveys covered about 600 producers of KIBS annually. Questionnaires 
included a set of questions that were asked each year and a set of specific ques-
tions that were asked only in particular year(s). The surveys were designed as 
semi-structured interviews with executives who answered questions on their own 
company and on more general market developments. All surveys were anony-
mous. Some firms may participate in several surveys (not necessarily successive), 
but this does not imply generalised results because only 15–20% of respondents 
reported that they participated twice.
In 2007 and 2011, parallel surveys covered over 700 business consumers of KIBS. 
The survey design was similar to KIBS providers one, and the questionnaires were 
as similar as possible, i.e. they aimed to include the same questions as the question-
naires for providers, for comparability. The 2007 survey also included public sector 
consumers (214 respondents) who answered the same questions as private firms, and 
these are the data that we use in this paper. Both business and private consumers 
were asked about their experiences with all KIBS sectors, and so we obtained over 
2000 observations from private customers and over 300 observations from public 
ones. For the analysis, we used the data from the 2007 survey, as our focus is on the 
public-versus-private comparison. If examples (of general developments) from other 
waves of the survey are given, this will be specifically mentioned.
Table  1 reports the scope of the survey in 2007. It was conducted in 13 cities 
from 9 regions. To obtain a more detailed picture, we divided respondents from 
the public sector into two groups: government/municipal bodies (149 respondents) 
and other public sector institutions, like public nurseries, public schools and librar-
ies (65 respondents). For comparison, 781 respondents from the private sector were 
surveyed.
Table 1 reveals an uneven structure of KIBS purchased by the public sector, with 
the majority of respondents having experience with advertising. Only a few of them 
used marketing or property development services. One of the main observations 
from this data is that the private sector is more homogeneous in terms of their expe-
rience with KIBS, whereas the public sector demonstrates excessive concentration 
in some areas (e.g. advertising and IT) and quite a limited experience with others 
(e.g. marketing). The data indicate that public sector institutions are more actively 
consuming KIBS, as compared with government bodies. The most frequently pur-
chased services for both of them have been advertisement and IT. Public sector 
institutions have more frequently been provided with audit (38.5% against 10.1% 
for government bodies), engineering (36.9% a gains 19.5%) and financial services 
(30.8% against 13.4%).
Table 2 shows the percentages of respondents in the public sector that reported 
having purchased KIBS (respondents from the private sector were not asked this 
question). Although it is theoretically possible that some services are used without 
being actually purchased (e.g. sponsorship, donorship or access to the service that 
had been purchased by a different institutional structure, which is possible in the 
public sector), a comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the amounts of purchases 
and amounts of usage are highly correlated. This allows us to relate the usage-related 
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features (like levels of satisfaction or absorption of services) to the method of pro-
curement used.
On average, in 2007 in each of the 10 KIBS sectors, 70% of respondents from 
government bodies reported expenditures on KIBS under 1 m roubles (appr. £20,000 
at the time of the survey), whereas 9% of them spent between 1 m and 5 m rou-
bles (appr. £20,000–£100,000). For public institutions, these figures were 59% and 
18%, respectively, whereas for the private sector they were noticeably lower; 44% 
of respondents reported expenditures under 500,000 roubles (£10,000) and 16%—
expenditures between 500,000 and 1mRUR (£10,000–20,000). The private sector 
is therefore more likely to spend large amounts on KIBS purchases (40% against 
21–23% in the public sector).
In the observed period, public procurement in Russia was regulated by the Fed-
eral Law No. 94-FZ “On placing orders to supply goods, perform work or provide 
services for state and municipal needs”, of 21 July 2005, which limited purchas-
ing mechanisms to mainly tenders and auctions. These provisions were not unique 
to Russia, although the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement suggested 
a variety of methods which all aimed to promote competition and transparency of 
procurement procedures (see UNCITRAL 2011), and they created obstacles for the 
proper selection of KIBS providers. In particular, 57% of public institutions reported 
that they were not satisfied with their providers, where 40% of providers reported 
losses from projects with public customers.
To judge on the method of procurement chosen, we use respondents’ answers 
to the question “How do you select providers of KIBS when purchasing their ser-
vices?”, where they were given the following options “We usually work with 1–2 
reliable suppliers”, “We choose from offers of 3–5 firms with good reputation”, 
“Tendering, including firms we don’t know yet”, or “None of the above”. We note 
that these answers can be associated with traditional labels for procurement meth-
ods such as single-source procurement, requests of quotations, and open tenders, 
respectively. With this wording of the question and the answer options, we cannot 
distinguish, for example, between auctions and open tenders, however our primary 
focus is on the number of participants in each selection procedure, hence available 
data is fit for purpose. The range of options were elaborated and validated during 
structured personal interviews with industry experts. This was because the original 
Table 2  Types of KIBS purchased by the public sector (Source: ISSEK-ROMIR surveys, 2007)
Percentage rows do not add up to 100 because each respondent answered questions about all consumed 
services, i.e. gave from 1 to 10 responses
AD advertising, MKT marketing services, ADT audit, IT information technology services, REC recruit-
ment services, ENG engineering services, FIN financial advice services, LEG legal advice services, DVP 
property development services, DSGN business design, Avg average across all responses
Avg Sectors
MKT AD ADT IT ENG REC DSGN DVP FIN LEG
Government bodies 20.2 10.7 41.6 10.1 36.9 19.5 17.4 21.5 6.7 13.4 24.8
Public institutions 26.2 12.3 41.5 38.5 32.3 36.9 23.1 13.9 12.3 30.8 20.0
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survey mainly addressed private businesses, which also explains the relatively small 
sample of public sector enterprises. In this sense, the answers to the question show 
which approaches out of those commonly used in the private sector are also popu-
lar in the public sector. The number of “None of the above/not sure” responses is 
almost negligible. From this, we may conclude that the question itself was comforta-
ble for respondents, and the list of procurement methods, whilst not exhaustive from 
the regulatory or theoretical point of view, still encompasses the vast majority of 
approaches with which respondents can identify themselves.
Among the main reasons for dissatisfaction, an average of 60% of public institu-
tions referred to missed deadlines, and 76% were unable to absorb the service prop-
erly. The latter figure potentially indicates insufficient co-production between public 
customers and KIBS providers, and the lack of proper knowledge transfer. On the 
one hand, legislative restrictions forbid any pre-contracting communication between 
the tenderer and its potential providers, though our analysis proves that it is exactly 
at this stage that the need for co-production is the greatest. On the other hand, public 
bodies have insufficient incentives for proper co-production, given that understaffing 
is a common problem, and purchases of services are typically considered as full out-
sourcing. Below we focus on these issues in more detail.
Our main variables—satisfaction, absorption and co-production –come from con-
sumers’ responses to the corresponding survey questions. Satisfaction is measured 
on a 5-point scale from answers to the question “Please, assess on a five-point scale, 
the degree to which your company is satisfied with the services you were provided, 
with 1 = not satisfied at all, and 5 = fully satisfied.” No further clarifications of “sat-
isfaction” were given to respondents, leaving the interpretation of the term up to 
them. Yet, in pilots and feedback respondents reported no difficulty in this, suggest-
ing satisfaction is a well understood concept.
We complement this rather broad measure of the value derived from the service, 
by looking at the degree of the service absorption, derived from answers to the ques-
tion “To which degree have you applied/implemented/used the results of the ser-
vices you were provided in [the given KIBS area]?”. Respondents could choose one 
of the following four options (or give no response): (1) the results were not used, 
(2) results were partly (to some extend) used/applied/implemented, (3) results were 
mainly, although not completely, applied/implemented/used, and (4) results were 
applied/implemented/used in full.
Finally, we look at the level of co-production in KIBS. Respondents asked the 
following question: “To which degree is your company, as a customer, involved in 
the process of the production3 of services you rendered”. Respondents were asked to 
use a 10-point scale, where 1 corresponds to “careful explanation of what is needed, 
and then no involvement at all until the work is done” and 10 corresponds to “full 
involvement, continuous interaction, joint realization of the project”. Providing these 
detailed descriptions of the options on the scale ensures respondents understand the 
question and the meaning of “co-production”.
3 In Russian, the word “realization” instead of “production” was used. In English-speaking literature the 
“production of services” is a more common term (e.g. Kelley et al. 1990).
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4  Results
Our most important and surprising result is that the  most popular procurement 
method, also in the private sector, is single-source procurement. The highest level 
of satisfaction is also achieved when the single-source procurement is chosen. The 
lowest level of satisfaction is achieved when procurement is implemented through 
tender procedures. After discussing the methods of procurement and the  levels of 
satisfaction, we complement the analysis in subsections 4.3 and 4.4 by focusing on 
co-production and absorption of KIBS.
4.1  Procurement methods
The main difference between purchases of KIBS in the private and public sectors is 
the method of procurement. The private sector is free of any constraints either on 
the choice of service provider or on the selection criteria. The public sector com-
plies with legislation that determines feasible procurement methods and specifies 
the selection criteria. This is a reason to analyze the degree of satisfaction from 
KIBS consumption, bearing in mind the selection approaches. The main procure-
ment methods are (1) tendering, (2) request for quotations, (3) request of proposals, 
(4) negotiations, (5) electronic reverse auctions, and (6) single-source procurement 
(see, e.g. UNCITRAL 2011).
The methods of procurement as reported by the respondents are shown in 
Tables 3, 4 and 5.
While single-source procurement is the most popular method for acquiring KIBS, 
strikingly, the private sector on average used single source procurement less fre-
quently than public organizations (differences significant4 at least p < 0.05 level). 
There are two possible explanations for this. The first one underlies public procure-
ment legislation, where corruption potentially drives public entities to use undesir-
able and inefficient methods of procurement (see, e.g. Castro et al. (2018) and ref-
erences therein for a discussion of corruption in public procurement.) The second 
one is suggested in this paper: existing legislative constraints and prescriptions on 
various forms of procurement do not leave enough space for their effective practical 
application. We prove that it is flexibility which makes tenders attractive to private 
businesses, while rigidities make this procedure inappropriate for KIBS procure-
ment by the public sector. UNCITRAL (2011) promotes the flexibility of procure-
ment procedures, particularly in tendering. EBRD (2011) indicated the rigidity of 
Russian procurement legislation at the time. We show that, in that period, tendering 
for KIBS actually generated lower customer satisfaction in the public sector, which 
was incompatible with the corruption view on the choice of procurement methods. 
Excessively constrained tendering was therefore indeed a less efficient mechanism 
than single-source procurement.
4 Where not reported otherwise, two-sided t-tests for differences in means were used.
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Fig. 1  a Joint distribution of responses to the questions “How do you purchase KIBS?” and “Estimate 
the level of your satisfaction with rendered KIBS “: government bodies. b Joint distribution of answers 
to the questions “How do you purchase KIBS” and “Estimate the level of your satisfaction with rendered 
KIBS “: public institutions
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4.2  Customer satisfaction
The relationship between the method of procurement and the level of satisfaction 
(as reported by the respondents) is not straightforward (see Fig. 1a for government 
bodies and Fig. 1b for public institutions). Both figures highlight that the number of 
highly satisfied customers remarkably increases when moving from tenders towards 
single source procurement, whereas dissatisfaction increases in the opposite direc-
tion. The majority of customers in the public sector achieve the highest level of sat-
isfaction when KIBS are purchased from 1 to 2 reliable suppliers.
It should be emphasized here that public procurement legislation encourages nei-
ther long-term relationships with suppliers, nor purchasing from a limited number 
of suppliers. A certain discrepancy therefore arises between the legislative objective 
and its actual effects; the number of absolutely satisfied respondents is relatively low 
for those who use tender procedures (23.8% in the private and 33.3% in the public 
sector). The share of satisfied private sector respondents who use single source pro-
curement is almost twice as high: 47.9% reported absolute satisfaction. Therefore, 
we can observe the advantages of the single source procurement in the free business 
environment, while in the public sector. The share of complete satisfaction from the 
single source procurement remains low (37.8%). The public sector derives the high-
est level of satisfaction (48.1%) from requests of quotations from 3 to 5 suppliers 
with good reputations (compared with 38.9% in private sector). Both public and pri-
vate sectors prefer to work with a limited number of KIBS suppliers, yet the amount 
of completely satisfied respondents in the public sector is remarkably smaller. From 
this, public procurement is rather less efficient, if satisfaction represents value for 
money.
Respondents were also asked about the criteria that they use when they choose 
service suppliers.5 For government bodies, the most important criteria are the time-
line of the service delivery (24.5% of responses), quality (23%) and the supplier’s 
experience (11.9%). The least important criterion is the supplier’s membership in 
professional associations. For public institutions, the results are similar: quality 
(24.9%), the timeline of service provision (18.8%) and experience (11.1%) are the 
most important, whereas membership in associations is not important at all. Other 
factors like the price of services, qualification of the service provider, personal con-
tacts and advice of peers are of medium importance (see Tables 6 and 7).
A comparison of Tables 6 and 7 shows that the quality of the service is the prime 
criterion for the private sector, while government bodies are mostly focused on the 
timeline of the service delivery (the difference between average popularity of the 
first and the second criterion is significant at p < 0.05 for the private sector, insignifi-
cant for the public sector). A possible explanation is that private sector businesses 
are results-oriented, and they are prepared to wait longer for the sake of perfect 
5 Similar, although partly differently worded, criteria are used by Gronroos (1988) as factors of good 
perceived service quality: (1) professionalism and skills, (2) friendly attitudes and behavior, (3) access 
and flexibility, (4) reliability and trustworthiness, (5) recovery, i.e. availability of an immediate corrective 
action if anything goes wrong, and (6) reputation and credibility.
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quality. For government bodies, reportability is more important, therefore rendering 
the timeframe of service delivery one of the key selection criteria.
Another observation from Tables 6 to 7 is that both the private sector and gov-
ernment bodies indicate the qualifications of the supplier’s personnel as a selection 
criterion more frequently than the low price (difference in the average percentage 
of responses between the two criteria is significant at p < 0.01). This effect might be 
insignificant due to the limited number of observations, yet it is worth mentioning. 
For the remainder of criteria, we do not observe any remarkable differences.
At the time of the survey, the procurement legislation in Russia established four 
main criteria for the public purchases of services: (1) price; (2) quality and quali-
fication (a single criterion); (3) timeline for delivery, and (4) conditions and war-
ranties. In many cases, the desired quality of KIBS cannot be formally and com-
pletely described in a call for offers (notification of contract, or invitation to tender). 
An important reason is that the ultimate quality of the rendered service crucially 
depends on the level of co-production and on the knowledge transfer between the 
consuming body and its supplier at the initial phase of the project (setting up the 
terms of reference). However, the legislation prohibits any communication between 
the parties once the call for offers has been published. As a result, the public sector 
does not have another option but to use suppliers’ qualifications as the best available 
proxies for the quality of their future services. Conversely, the private sector enjoys 
the flexibility of communications with potential suppliers when negotiating the con-
tract, when the proper specifications of the desired quality of KIBS are determined. 
As a result, the quality requirements (this is the most important factor for the private 
sector) are fixed in the contract; the qualifications of the service provider do not par-
ticularly matter, and the price factor becomes more important.
The low priority of customer-centricity in the public sector is also in line with 
our general point that consumers from the private sector have better incentives (and 
flexibility) to be engaged in efficient co-production with service suppliers. The avail-
ability of supplier’s help and advice during and after the service provision is an 
important factor for general satisfaction. Again, a formal description of the “cus-
tomer-oriented approach” in a public call for offers is hardly possible, while “mar-
ket history” is a measurable criterion, which therefore gains higher importance for 
KIBS consumers from the public sector.
4.3  Co‑production
KIBS production is hardly efficient without close cooperation between suppliers and 
their customers. The nature of KIBS implies the need in a specific knowledge about 
the particular customer rather than common knowledge about a generalised con-
sumer. A knowledge-intensive service therefore has two producers instead of one: 
a company who renders the service (it supplies its intellectual resources, mainly 
qualified labour), and a company who orders a service (it supplies its information 
resources, i.e. knowledge about itself). This process is called external resource 
incorporation or co-production.
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Our survey shows that 33.3% of government bodies and 20.9% of public institu-
tions estimate their involvement in co-production as low (score 1–4 on a 10-point 
scale), while 42.7% of government bodies and 45.9% of public institution estimated 
it as high (scores 7–10 on the 10–point scale). Although we observe gaps between 
the perceptions of public institutions and government bodies, the one on the upper 
part of the scale is not significant. A more crucial difference arises between pub-
lic customers as a whole and private KIBS users. Only 15.9% of consumers from 
the private sector estimate their co-production as low and 57.5% attribute it a score 
between 7 and 10 (see Fig. 2 for details). This difference between private and public 
sectors6 supports our hypothesis about stronger incentives for the private sector to 
co-produce KIBS.
The levels of co-production vary between sectors. Though this paper does not 
aim to perform a thorough cross-section analysis, some differences are notable. 
Advertising, for example, shows little difference between public and private sectors 
(24–52% of respondents give their engagement co-production the highest scores of 
7–10). In engineering, the share of high scores in the public sector reaches 72.6%, 
against 48.6% in the private sector. Similarly, in property development, the share of 
intensive co-producers in the public sector is larger than in the private one (53.6% 
against 49.4%), although the difference is not significant. In design, government 
bodies report high co-production more frequently than the private sector (63.6% 
against 59.6%) while public institutions do so less frequently (56.8%). Again, the 
gap may seem insignificant, but this example reemphasizes the differences between 
Fig. 2  Levels of co-production (horizontally) as estimated by KIBS consumers (average percentage over 
all reported sectors, vertically)
6 Differences between distributions of responses of government bodies and private firms are significant 
at p < 0.01 (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test).
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government bodies and public institutions taken together and the private sector. This 
issue requires more detailed investigation in a separate study.
The 2007 survey did not address the question of the reasons for insufficient 
customer co-production with public bodies, yet a subsequent survey in 2011 
Fig. 3  a Reasons for insufficient co-production (ISSEK-ROMIR survey of private KIBS consumers, 
2011). b Reasons for insufficient co-production (ISSEK-ROMIR survey of KIBS providers, 2011)
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posed this question to business customers. The main reasons in the private sector 
are shortages of resources (the staff does not have enough time for extra duties, 
30.6% of respondents) and a negative attitude towards co-production (“we are 
paying for the service and it’s the service provider who should work”, 26.4%)—
see Fig. 3a for details.
A slightly different picture is given by service providers (Fig.  3b), who 
answered the same question about the reasons for insufficient co-production, 
using the same 10-point scale. Importantly, we did not ask them to distinguish 
between public and private sectors, i.e. they gave only general estimates. The 
view of KIBS providers (on customers in general) differs from that of private 
customers. Providers noticeably mention customers’ resistance to co-production, 
whereas sector customers more frequently argue that their staff has no time to 
participate in co-production. These differences may be explained by a difference 
in perception, yet an important point is that providers’ experience covers cus-
tomers from the public sector as well. If this asymmetry can, at least partially, 
be explained by the attitude of public sector managers, then we would expect a 
higher resistance to co-produce in the public sector, as well as a more pronounced 
Fig. 4  Required (blue) and actual (red) levels of co-production (on a scale from 1 to 10, x-axis, lowest 
co-production on the left, highest to the right; percentage of responses on the y-axis); ISSEK-ROMIR 
survey of KIBS suppliers, 2011) (color figure online)
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role of other factors which prevent efficient co-production. On this point, an inter-
esting observation has been documented by Lan and Rainey (1992) who stress 
that managers in the public sector are more likely to stick to the rules and formal 
job descriptions. This suggests that a more formalistic approach in the public sec-
tor may be deemed responsible for a lower level of co-production. Generally, this 
is consistent with our observations on the reasons for poor co-production in the 
public sector.
Co-production varies at different stages of the project’s implementation. We 
distinguish between four stages: preliminary (before the start of the project, e.g. 
clarifications of the terms of references), initial (the preparation and the start 
of the project), main (the actual production of the service) and final (completion, 
final adjustment of the project’s results to the client’s needs and clarification of the 
remaining issues and the final report) stages of the KIBS provision. Figure 4 com-
pares two profiles of co-production: the one that KIBS suppliers need for proper 
service provision (required, or desired, co-production) and the one they perceive as 
actually achieved with their customers (actual co-production). Note that the desired 
level of co-production on average exceeds the actual one at all four stages, although 
the distribution of responses is rather flat. Importantly, at all four stages, the num-
ber of suppliers who require highest co-production (at level 10) is about twice as 
high as the number of those who actually report this high level of co-production. A 
strong need for co-production at the preliminary stage (preparation of the terms of 
reference) changes by lower co-production at the initial and in the main stages, and 
then by the new increase of co-production at the final stage of the project. Figure 4 
depicts visible changes in the distributions of answers. The distribution in the pre-
liminary phase noticeably shifts towards lower scores compared with other panels, 
and the distribution at the main stage is closer to uniform than any other. The dis-
tributions at the beginning and final stages are quite similar to each other. Signifi-
cantly, it is the preliminary stage that requires (and involves) the most intensive co-
production (the vast majority of respondents gave scores of 5 and above).
The typical public procurement legislation forbids interactions between a public 
body and the potential supplier of services at the preliminary stage of procurement 
procedures. This norm hinders co-production at a very important stage, when the 
parameters of the demanded service should be specified during close interactions 
between consumers and suppliers. Further on, co-production at later stages may 
require adjustments and amendments of the initial terms of reference, when custom-
ers achieve a better understanding of their needs after benefiting from the knowledge 
transfer from KIBS suppliers (see Doroshenko 2012). Any changes in contracts are 
usually prohibited by public procurement legislations. Regulatory constraints there-
fore put obstacles in the way of proper co-production and thus hinder proper satis-
faction from KIBS in the public sector.
Table  8 presents the joint distribution of co-production and satisfaction.7 
Responses from the private sector are concentrated around high co-production and 
high satisfaction. This can be viewed as a proxy for the first-best outcome, because 
7 Each cell gives the percentage of respondents that gave the corresponding combination of answers.
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private firms are unconstrained in their choice of the level of co-production, in com-
parison to the public sector. The latter, however, demonstrates noticeable differ-
ences. As discussed above, government bodies are highly constrained by the law 
in their ability to coproduce, which is reflected in the distribution of their answers, 
demonstrating roughly equal likelihoods of low and high co-production. Less con-
strained public sector institutions show higher levels of co-production. It is difficult 
to judge based on the link between co-production and satisfaction, although the 
unconstrained choice of private firms indirectly suggests that higher satisfaction may 
be achieved through better co-production.
On the one hand, co-production does not appear to contribute much to the ulti-
mate satisfaction of government bodies and public institutions from the services 
rendered. On the other hand, co-production is indispensable for the provision of 
highly customized KIBS (see, e.g. Bettencourt et al. 2002). This suggests that pub-
lic procurement of KIBS lacks customization. Indeed, existing restrictions on quali-
tative choice criteria and the emphasized role of formalized parameters of public 
purchases all prohibited communications with potential service providers before 
the start of procurement procedure. The rigidity of the contract in terms of ongoing 
changes might lead to a high degree of standardization of services. These standard 
services do not require high levels of co-production. As a result, if the customer 
prefers standard services, high satisfaction may be achieved even if co-production is 
low.
4.4  Absorption of services
The absorption of KIBS is another important indicator of procurement efficiency. 
Indeed, the service cannot be fully absorbed if it does not perfectly match the needs 
of the customer. Our data do not reveal any significant difference between service 
absorption in public and private sectors in general, though the levels of absorp-
tion of different KIBS vary. 73% of the government bodies report full absorption 
of KIBS, and 18% reported that services are mostly absorbed. Public institutions 
reported 79% and 16.2%, respectively, while the private sector reported 78.9% and 
10.8%, respectively.8 These results seem to contradict our previous findings about 
the relationship between co-production and satisfaction. If higher co-production 
leads to better satisfaction, and if satisfied customers are more likeliy to absorb ser-
vices in full, then the public sector should be less likely to report full absorbtion of 
KIBS, which contradicts the aforementioned observations. To explain this puzzle, 
we turn to the suppliers’ data.
Suppliers of KIBS believe that only 68.2% of their KIBS are fully absorbed, and 
14.2% are absorbed partially. This asymmetry of perception on the levels of absorp-
tion between service providers and their customers provides a key to the puzzle. 
Suppliers have perfect information about the properties of their KIBS and on the 
efforts that the customer should undertake in order to use the service properly. Even 
8 Differences between government bodies and private firms are significant at least at p < 0.05.
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if the customer firm might seem to know its ability to absorb the service better than 
the supplier does, it is however the supplier who can find the untapped potential of 
the delivered service. This overestimation of the degree of absorption is observed 
both in the public and private sectors. Despite this, we argue that co-production 
helps private enterprises to provide a more accurate estimate.
Co-production helps consumers improve their understanding of their own needs. 
Consider a customer with strong incentives to co-produce; their initial knowledge 
about the rendered service often changes during co-production, e.g. the customer 
may discover unexpected benefits from service consumption, along with understand-
ing that not all service qualities are easily absorbed (they might require additional 
training of staff, or even organizational changes). The perceived level of absorption 
reported by this customer will then be high compared to initial expectations, though 
imperfect in comparison with the new deeper knowledge that was obtained through 
co-production.
On the contrary, a customer with weak incentives for co-production acquires less 
new knowledge, and therefore their understanding of benefits from co-production 
does not differ much from initial expectations. If the final service design is similar 
to the one initially commissioned, then a high level of absorption is most likely to 
be reported because the customer was prepared to absorb exactly what was initially 
rendered. In other words, the perceived level of absorption crucially depends on the 
customer’s grasp of this service, which, in turn, depends on co-production.9
Do chosen methods of procurement affect absorption? Table  9 shows that the 
absorptive capacity of KIBS consumers is highly sensitive to procurement methods. 
Similarly to satisfaction, the highest reported absorption is associated with single-
source procurement in the public sector, whereas the private sector demonstrates a 
substantially larger share of consumers who are able to achieve the highest level of 
absorption after an open, flexible tender.
Table 9  Relationship between service absorption and the method of procurement (per cent of responses)
Method Degree of absorption (from low to high)
a) Government bodies b) Public institutions c) Private sector
1–2 1.3 0.8 11.7 56.1 0.7 2.1 7.1 61.4 0.8 1.6 3.2 43.6
3–5 0 0.4 2.9 12.1 1.4 0.7 2.1 14.3 0.1 1.3 2.6 11.7
Tender 0.4 0.4 5.0 8.8 0 0 3.6 6.4 0.2 1.3 5.2 28.4
9 Alternatively, an abnormally high (as compared to satisfaction) level of service absorption in the public 
sector can be explained by a tendency of public bodies to render more standardized KIBS, which are also 
easier to absorb. As discussed above, this is due to the regulatory requirements to publish full specifica-
tions of the items (services) to be purchased, prior to the start of the procurement procedure. The issue 
of standardization is not the focus of the current paper, but this argument is in line with the main finding, 
which is that it is a lack of flexibility in the procurement regulation that lowers efficiency in the con-
sumption of KIBS by the public sector.
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We can interpret the matrices in Table 9 as joint probability distributions for pro-
curement methods and levels of absorption. This view suggests that if government 
bodies use single-source procurement or offers from a limited number of suppliers, the 
probability of achieving the highest level of absorption is almost 80%, while if they 
announce a tender, the probability decreases to 60%. For public institutions, the respec-
tive probabilities are 86% in case of a single-source procurement, 76% for offers from 3 
to 5 suppliers, and 64% for a tender. The private sector exhibits the highest probabilities 
of achieving a perfect absorption of KIBS (89% for single-source procurement, 75% 
for offers from 3 to 5 suppliers, and 81% for tenders.) If we focus on tenders only, the 
private sector demonstrates a notably higher probability of perfect absorption than the 
public sector. In the public sector, the more competitive the procurement procedure, the 
lower the chance for perfect absorption.
Is there any relationship between absorption and satisfaction? One way to look at it 
is through the joint distribution of responses, as in Table 10, from which we can derive 
conditional probabilities of achieving a particular level of satisfaction, given the level of 
absorption. In both the public and the private sectors, we observe that the likelihood of 
absolute satisfaction increases with the degree of absorption: for example, among those 
government bodies who report some absorption none report absolute satisfaction (the 
majority, two-thirds, report “rather satisfied”), while the fraction of absolutely satisfied 
grows to 32.17% among those who report absorption to a larger degree, and further to 
43.95% among those who report full absorption (precise definitions and gradations are 
in Sect. 3). Similarly, among public institutions who report absorption to a large degree, 
the likelihood of being absolutely satisfied is 26.32%, growing to 35.37% among those 
who report full absorption. The relationship seems to be stronger in the private sector: 
20% of those who report “some” absorption also report absolute satisfaction, growing 
to 32.05% of those who report large degrees of absorption and to 73.5% among those 
who report full absorption. Looking at the two highest levels of satisfaction together, 
delivers the probability of being fully or rather satisfied, given the full absorption of 
services, 98% in the private sector vs. 83–84% in public sector.
The results are surprising. Full absorption of KIBS in the private sector almost auto-
matically means absolute or close to that satisfaction, while in the public sector appro-
priation and satisfaction hardly correlate at all; for over 15% of those who report full 
absorption, a fully absorbed service is associated with dissatisfaction. Our discussion 
above suggests the puzzle appears due to mechanisms of procurement. Recall from 
Fig. 1a, b that the proper choice of the procurement procedure (the single-source pro-
curement that does not break the law) provides an 87% probability of satisfaction in 
the public sector. If a procuring body has to use a different method of procurement, it 
can absorb the service in full, but given the limitations of the procurement method, this 
service does not perfectly match the needs of the customer, which is reflected in a lower 
satisfaction.
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5  Conclusions
Although public purchases of KIBS could, in general, be efficient, they face a 
number of obstacles. In this paper, we focused on the methods of procurement and 
legislative constraints as potential sources of inefficiency. Our surveys covered 
public institutions and government bodies which faced the above constraints, and 
private firms, who we use as an “unconstrained optimum” benchmark. The data 
suggests that single-source procurement is the best choice in the unconstrained 
case: it is the most frequently used by private businesses and it maximizes the 
probability of achieving the highest satisfaction. Despite regulatory constraints, it 
is also the most popular procurement method in the public sector. However, even 
tendering ensures a much higher probability of satisfaction in the private sector 
than in the public one. This can be explained by the limited range of permitted 
selection criteria for tenders in the public sector, which were imposed by procure-
ment legislation at the time of the survey. Importantly, this legislation stipulated 
that price should always be used as one of the criteria, and its weight among other 
criteria may be as high as 80%. In our data, price, however, is not the dominating 
factor for public bodies in procurement procedures. This exemplifies the sort of 
efficiency-reducing constraints that we address in this paper. In order to change 
the situation, it is important to allow for more flexibility in the public procure-
ment of KIBS, to relax restrictions on tenders and competitions, and to reduce the 
weight of price in the selection criteria.
Our results also highlight that the choice of the procurement method might 
matter for consumers’ satisfaction and the absorption of services. The flexibility 
in procurement which the private sector enjoys, ensures a better choice of the ser-
vice provider, better co-production at the preliminary negotiations stage, and the 
ability to make changes in contract specifications at later stages of the project’s 
implementation, if co-production reveals the need for them. On the contrary, 
the public sector operates under restrictions, which often forbid communication 
between the purchasing entity and the supplier of services, require a fixed set of 
service specifications to be identified and announced before the procurement pro-
cedure, and discourage long-term customer relationships. In our view, it is these 
restrictions that force public sector consumers to prefer single-source procure-
ment as the best option to achieve high satisfaction and the absorption of services 
(recall, this is the preferred option in the private sector as well). This is intuitively 
in line with suggestion that previous experience with a particular provider not 
only signals the quality of this provider’s services, but is also beneficial in terms 
of knowledge that the provider has already gained about this particular customer.
Alongside this, for the private sector we observe that tenders may be at least 
as efficient as single source procurement. This is particularly important if a new 
service is being rendered, with no previous experience with any of the potential 
providers (also, possibly, in innovation procurement as in Iossa et al. 2018). For 
the public sector we observe the worst satisfaction from KIBS ordered through 
tenders (as compared to other procurement methods). This emphasizes the impact 
of regulatory restrictions faced by the public sector. If the legislation aims to 
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improve efficiency (increasing satisfaction and absorption of services), it should 
allow for greater flexibility in public procurement.
Some of these issues are already addressed under the UNCITRAL Model Law 
(UNCITRAL 2011). Our analysis suggests that its provisions, particularly the flex-
ibility of choice in procurement methods, should resolve some of the problems 
mentioned in this paper, although this deserves a further investigation in a sepa-
rate paper. However, we should recognize that with regulated purchases of KIBS, 
an attempt to promote competitive procurement may force public sector entities 
to render standardized services that do not perfectly match their needs. A full and 
exhaustive specification of the service is not feasible at the preliminary stage with-
out consulting potential suppliers, and changes in specifications at later stages may 
result in greater efficiency rather than in corruption. It is also important to recognize 
that long-term relationships improve the efficiency of KIBS production, due to bet-
ter knowledge of the particular customer.
Finally, it is widely accepted that managerial incentives in the public and private 
sectors differ. Our findings nevertheless indicate that there are important distinctions 
within the public sector itself, i.e. between government bodies and other public insti-
tutions (public nurseries, public schools, libraries, etc.). The latter differ from the 
private sector much less than the former, especially in terms of co-production. How-
ever, our survey samples were limited, and so these results require further testing.
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